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DNS Internet Papers Publications Uncategorized

new paper “Defending Root DNS Servers Against DDoS Using Layered Defenses” at COMSNETS 2023 (best paper!)

Our paper titled “Defending Root DNS Servers Against DDoS Using Layered Defenses” will appear at COMSNETS 2023 in January 2023. In this work, by ASM Rizvi, Jelena Mirkovic, John Heidemann, Wes Hardaker, and Robert Story, we design an automated system named DDIDD with multiple filters to handle an ongoing DDoS attack on a DNS root server. We evaluated ten real-world attack events on B-root and showed DDIDD could successfully mitigate these attack events. We released the datasets for these attack events on our dataset webpage (dataset names starting with B_Root_Anomaly).

Update in January: we are happy to announce that this paper was awarded Best Paper for COMSNETS 2023! Thanks for the recognition.

Table II from [Rizvi23a] shows the performance of each individual filter, with near-best results in bold. This table shows that one filter covers all cases, but together in DDIDD they provide very tood defense.

From the abstract:

Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks exhaust resources, leaving a server unavailable to legitimate clients. The Domain Name System (DNS) is a frequent target of DDoS attacks. Since DNS is a critical infrastructure service, protecting it from DoS is imperative. Many prior approaches have focused on specific filters or anti-spoofing techniques to protect generic services. DNS root nameservers are more challenging to protect, since they use fixed IP addresses, serve very diverse clients and requests, receive predominantly UDP traffic that can be spoofed, and must guarantee high quality of service. In this paper we propose a layered DDoS defense for DNS root nameservers. Our defense uses a library of defensive filters, which can be optimized for different attack types, with different levels of selectivity. We further propose a method that automatically and continuously evaluates and selects the best combination of filters throughout the attack. We show that this layered defense approach provides exceptional protection against all attack types using traces of real attacks from a DNS root nameserver. Our automated system can select the best defense within seconds and quickly reduce the traffic to the server within a manageable range while keeping collateral damage lower than 2%. We can handle millions of filtering rules without noticeable operational overhead.

This work is partially supported by the National Science
Foundation (grant NSF OAC-1739034) and DHS HSARPA
Cyber Security Division (grant SHQDC-17-R-B0004-TTA.02-
0006-I), in collaboration with NWO.

A screen capture of the presentation of the best paper award.

Categories
DNS Papers Publications

New paper and talk “Institutional Privacy Risks in Sharing DNS Data” at Applied Networking Research Workshop 2021

Basileal Imana presented the paper “Institutional Privacy Risks in Sharing DNS Data” by Basileal Imana, Aleksandra Korolova and John Heidemann at Applied Networking Research Workshop held virtually from July 26-28th, 2021.

From the abstract:

We document institutional privacy as a new risk
posed by DNS data collected at authoritative servers, even
after caching and aggregation by DNS recursives. We are the
first to demonstrate this risk by looking at leaks of e-mail
exchanges which show communications patterns, and leaks
from accessing sensitive websites, both of which can harm an
institution’s public image. We define a methodology to identify queries from institutions and identify leaks. We show the
current practices of prefix-preserving anonymization of IP
addresses and aggregation above the recursive are not sufficient to protect institutional privacy, suggesting the need for
novel approaches.

Number of MX and DNSBL queries in a week-long root DNS data that can potentially leak email-related activity

The data from this paper is available upon request, please see our project page.

Categories
DNS Internet

APNIC Blog Post on the effects of chromium generated DNS traffic to the root server system

During the summer of 2019, Haoyu Jiang and Wes Hardaker studied the effects of DNS traffic sent to the root serevr system by chromium-based web browsers. The results of this short research effort were posted to the APNIC blog.

Categories
DNS Internet

B-root’s new sites reduce latency

B-Root, one of the 13 root DNS servers, deployed three new sites in January 2020, doubling its footprint and adding its first sites in Asia and Europe. How did this growth lower latency to users? We looked at B-Root deployment with Verfploter to answer this question. The end result was that new sites in Asia and Europe allowed users there to resolve DNS names with B-Root with lower latency (see the catchment map below). For more details please review our anycast catchment page.

B-root added 3 new sites in Singapore, Washington, DC, and Amsterdam to their three existing 3 sites in Los Angeles, Chile, and Miami. The graph below shows anycast catchments after these sites were deployed (each color in the pie charts shows traffic to a different site).

Categories
Announcements DNS Internet

Early longitudinal results in measuring the usage of Mozilla’s DNS Canary

Mozilla announced the creation of a “use-application-dns.net” “Canary Domain” that could be configured within ISPs to disable Firefox’s default use of DNS over HTTPS. On 2019/09/21 Wes Hardaker created a RIPE Atlas measurement to study resolvers within ISPs that had been configured to return an NXDOMAIN response. This measurement is configured to have 1000 Atlas probes query for the use-application-dns.net name once a day.

The full description of methodology is on Wes’ ISI site, which should receive regular updates to the graph.

canary

Categories
DNS Papers Publications

new conference paper “When the Dike Breaks: Dissecting DNS Defenses During DDoS” at ACM IMC 2018

We have published a new paper “When the Dike Breaks: Dissecting DNS Defenses During DDoS” in the ACM Internet Measurements Conference (IMC 2018) in Boston, Mass., USA.

From the abstract:

Caching and retries protect half of clients even with 90% loss and an attack twice the cache duration. (Figure 7c from [Moura18b].)

The Internet’s Domain Name System (DNS) is a frequent target of Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks, but such attacks have had very different outcomes—some attacks have disabled major public websites, while the external effects of other attacks have been minimal. While on one hand the DNS protocol is relatively simple, the \emph{system} has many moving parts, with multiple levels of caching and retries and replicated servers. This paper uses controlled experiments to examine how these mechanisms affect DNS resilience and latency, exploring both the client side’s DNS \emph{user experience}, and server-side traffic. We find that, for about 30\% of clients, caching is not effective. However, when caches are full they allow about half of clients to ride out server outages that last less than cache lifetimes, Caching and retries together allow up to half of the clients to tolerate DDoS attacks longer than cache lifetimes, with 90\% query loss, and almost all clients to tolerate attacks resulting in 50\% packet loss. While clients may get service during an attack, tail-latency increases for clients. For servers, retries during DDoS attacks increase normal traffic up to $8\times$. Our findings about caching and retries help explain why users see service outages from some real-world DDoS events, but minimal visible effects from others.

Datasets from this paper are available at no cost and are listed at https://ant.isi.edu/datasets/dns/#Moura18b_data.

 

Categories
DNS Papers Presentations Publications

New paper and talk “Enumerating Privacy Leaks in DNS Data Collected above the Recursive” at NDSS DNS Privacy Workshop 2018

Basileal Imana presented the paper “Enumerating Privacy Leaks in DNS Data Collected  above the Recursive” at NDSS DNS Privacy Workshop in San Diego, California, USA on February 18, 2018. Talk slides are available at https://ant.isi.edu/~imana/presentations/Imana18b.pdf and paper is available at  https://ant.isi.edu/~imana/papers/Imana18a.pdf, or can be found at the DNS privacy workshop page.

From the abstract:

Threat model for enumerating leaks above the recursive (left). Percentage of four categories of queries containing IPv4 addresses in their QNAMEs. (right)

As with any information system consisting of data derived from people’s actions, DNS data is vulnerable to privacy risks. In DNS, users make queries through recursive resolvers to authoritative servers. Data collected below (or in) the recursive resolver directly exposes users, so most prior DNS data sharing focuses on queries above the recursive resolver. Data collected above a recursive resolver has largely been seen as posing a minimal privacy risk since recursive resolvers typically aggregate traffic for many users, thereby hiding their identity and mixing their traffic. Although this assumption is widely made, to our knowledge it has not been verified. In this paper we re-examine this assumption for DNS traffic above the recursive resolver. First, we show that two kinds of information appear in query names above the recursive resolver: IP addresses and sensitive domain names, such as those pertaining to health, politics, or personal or lifestyle information. Second, we examine how often these classes of potentially sensitive names appear in Root DNS traffic, using 48 hours of B-Root data from April 2017.

This is a joint work by Basileal Imana (USC), Aleksandra Korolova (USC) and John Heidemann (USC/ISI).

The DITL dataset (ITL_B_Root-20170411) used in this work is available from DHS IMPACT, the ANT project, and through DNS-OARC.

Categories
DNS Presentations

new talk “LocalRoot: Serve Yourself”

Wes Hardaker gave a talk on his LocalRoot project, allowing recursive resolver operators to keep an up to date cached copy of the root zone data available at all times. The talk was held in Abu Dhabi on November 1, 2017 at the ICANN annual general meeting during the DNSSEC Workshop. Slides and recorded video are available at on the ICANN event page.

Categories
DNS Papers Publications

new journal paper “Detecting Malicious Activity With DNS Backscatter Over Time” in IEEE/ACM ToN Oct, 2017

The paper “Detecting Malicious Activity With DNS Backscatter Over Time ” appears in EEE/ACM  Transactions on Networking ( Volume: 25, Issue: 5, Oct. 2017 ).

From the abstract:

Network-wide activity is when one computer (the originator) touches many others (the targets). Motives for activity may be benign (mailing lists, CDNs, and research scanning), malicious (spammers and scanners for security vulnerabilities), or perhaps indeterminate (ad trackers). Knowledge of malicious activity may help anticipate attacks, and understanding benign activity may set a baseline or characterize growth. This paper identifies DNS backscatter as a new source of information about network-wide activity. Backscatter is the reverse DNS queries caused when targets or middleboxes automatically look up the domain name of the originator. Queries are visible to the authoritative DNS servers that handle reverse DNS. While the fraction of backscatter they see depends on the server’s location in the DNS hierarchy, we show that activity that touches many targets appear even in sampled observations. We use information about the queriers to classify originator activity using machine learning. Our algorithm has reasonable accuracy and precision (70–80%) as shown by data from three different organizations operating DNS servers at the root or country-level. Using this technique we examine nine months of activity from one authority to identify trends in scanning, identifying bursts corresponding to Heartbleed and broad and continuous scanning of ssh.

This paper furthers our understanding of evolution of malicious network activities from an earlier work that:
(1) Why our machine-learning based classifier (that relies on manually collected labeled data) does not port across physical sites and over time.
(2) Secondly paper recommends how to sustain good learning score over time and provides expected life-time of labeled data.

An excerpt from section III-E (Training Over Time):

Classification (§ III-D) is based on training, yet training accuracy is affected by the evolution of activity—specific examples come and go, and the behavior in each class evolves. Change happens for all classes, but the problem is particularly acute for malicious classes (such as spam) where the adversarial nature of the action forces rapid evolution (see § V).

 

Some datasets used in this paper can be found here:

Categories
Announcements DNS Internet

B-Root begins anycast

We are happy to report that B-Root has begun anycasting on 2017-05-02 from two sites (Miami and Los Angeles).  The ANT project has helped support this effort with anycast measurements.  See the official announcement on the B-Root webpage, and watch here for more details about the measurement approaches.