Tag: ipv6

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Technical Report

New technical report: Towards a Non-Binary View of IPv6 Adoption 

We have released a new technical report: “Towards a Non-Binary View of IPv6 Adoption”, available at https://arxiv.org/abs/2507.11678.

From the abstract:

Breakdown of domains hosted by major cloud providers into IPv4-only (red), IPv6-only (black) and IPv6-full, i.e., IPv4+IPv6 (blue). See Section 5 of the technical report for details. (Figure 10 from the paper.)

Twelve years have passed since World IPv6 Launch Day, but what is the current state of IPv6 deployment? Prior work has examined IPv6 status as a binary: can you use IPv6, or not? As deployment increases we must consider a more nuanced, non-binary perspective on IPv6: how much and often can a user or a service use IPv6? We consider this question as a client, server, and cloud provider. Considering the client’s perspective, we observe user traffic. We see that the fraction of IPv6 traffic a user sends varies greatly, both across users and day-by-day, with a standard deviation of over 15%. We show this variation occurs for two main reasons. First, IPv6 traffic is primarily human-generated, thus showing diurnal patterns. Second, some services are IPv6-forward and others IPv6-laggards, so as users do different things their fraction of IPv6 varies. We look at server-side IPv6 adoption in two ways. First, we expand analysis of web services to examine how many are only partially IPv6 enabled due to their reliance on IPv4-only resources. Our findings reveal that only 12.5% of top 100k websites qualify as fully IPv6-ready. Finally, we examine cloud support for IPv6. Although all clouds and CDNs support IPv6, we find that tenant deployment rates vary significantly across providers. We find that ease of enabling IPv6 in the cloud is correlated with tenant IPv6 adoption rates, and recommend best practices for cloud providers to improve IPv6 adoption. Our results suggest IPv6 deployment is growing, but many services lag, presenting a potential for improvement.

This technical report is a joint work of Sulyab Thottungal Valapu from USC, and John Heidemann from USC/ISI. This work was partially supported by the NSF via the PIMAWAT and InternetMap projects.

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Uncategorized

congratulations to Sandeep Muthu for his summer undergraduate research internship

Sandeep Muthu completed his summer undergraduate research internship at ISI this summer, working with John Heidemann and Yuri Pradkin on his project “Determining the Risks of Tunnels Over the Internet”.

In his project, Sandeep examined how unauthenticated tunneling protocols can be infiltrated, and how often they are used in the Internet. He demonstrated that tunnels can be exploited in the DETER testbed, and showed that there are many tunnels in general use based on analysis of anonymized IXP data.

Sandeep Muthu sharing his poster at the ISI undergraduate research poster session in July 2023.

Sandeep’s work was part of the ISI Research Experiences for Undergraduates program at USC/ISI. We thank Jelena Mirkovic (PI) for coordinating another year of this great program, and NSF for support through award #2051101. We also thank the University of Memphis (Christos Papadopoulos) and FIU

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Uncategorized

congratulations to Tarang Saluja for his summer undergraduate research internship

Tarang Saluja completed his summer undergraduate research internship at ISI this summer, working with John Heidemann and Yuri Pradkin on his project “Differences in Monitoring the DNS Root Over IPv4 and IPv6″.

In his project, Tarang examined RIPE Atlas’s DNSmon, a measurement system that monitors the Root Server System. DNSmon examines both IPv4 and IPv6, and its IPv6 reports show query loss rates that are consistently higher than IPv4, often 4-6% IPv6 loss vs. no or 2% IPv4 loss. Prior results by researchers at RIPE suggested these differences were due to problems at specific Atlas Vantage Points (VPs, also called Atlas Probes).

Tarang Saluja describing his research to an ISI researcher, at the ISI REU Poster Session on 2022-08-01.

Building on the Guillero Baltra’s studies of partial connectivity in the Internet, Tarang classified Atlas VPs with problems as islands and peninsulas. Islands think they are on IPv6, but cannot reach any of the 13 Root DNS “letters” over IPv6, indicating that the VP has a local network configuration problem. Peninsulas can reach some letters, but not others, indicating a routing problem somewhere in the core of the Internet.

Tarang’s work is important because these observations allow lead to potential solutions. Islands suggest VPs that do not support IPv6 and so should not be used for monitoring. Peninsulas point to IPv6 routing problems that need to be addressed by ISPs. Setting VPs with these problems aside provides a more accurate view of what IPv6 should be, and allows us to use DNSmon to detect more subtle problems. Together, his work points the way to improving IPv6 for everyone and improving Root DNS access over IPv6.

Tarang’s work was part of the ISI Research Experiences for Undergraduates program at USC/ISI. We thank Jelena Mirkovic (PI) for coordinating another year of this great program, and NSF for support through award #2051101.

Categories
Internet Papers Publications Software releases

new paper “Chhoyhopper: A Moving Target Defense with IPv6” at NDSS MADWeb Workshop 2022

On April 24, 2022 we will publish a new paper titled “Chhoyhopper: A Moving Target Defense with IPv6” by A S M Rizvi and John Heidemann at the 4th Workshop on Measurements, Attacks, and Defenses for the Web (MADWeb 2022), co-located with NDSS. We provide Chhoyhopper as an open-source tool for SSH and HTTPS—try it out!

From the abstract:

Services on the public Internet are frequently scanned, then subject to brute-force password attempts and Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. We would like to run such services stealthily, where they are available to friends but hidden from adversaries. In this work, we propose a discovery-resistant moving target defense named “Chhoyhopper” that utilizes the vast IPv6 address space to conceal publicly available services. The client meets the server at an IPv6 address that changes in a pattern based on a shared, pre-distributed secret and the time of day. By hopping over a /64 prefix, services cannot be found by active scanners, and passively observed information is useless after two minutes. We demonstrate our system with the two important applications—SSH and HTTPS, and make our system publicly available.

Client and server interaction in Chhoyhopper. A Client with the right secret key can only get access into the system.

Thanks: A S M Rizvi and John Heidemann’s work on this paper is supported, in part, by the DHS HSARPA Cyber Security Division via contract number HSHQDC-17-R-B0004-TTA.02-0006-I (PAADDoS), and by DARPA under Contract No. HR001120C0157 (SABRES). Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of NSF or DARPA. We thank Rayner Pais who prototyped an early version of Chhoyhopper and version in IPv4 hopping over ports.