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new talk “Measuring DANE TLSA Deployment” given at DNS-OARC

Liang Zhu gave the talk “Measuring DANE TLSA Deployment”, given at the Fall DNS-OARC meeting in Los Angeles, California on Oct 12, 2014.  Slides are available: http://www.isi.edu/~liangzhu/presentation/dns-oarc/dane_tlsa_survey.pdf

From the abstract:

The DANE (DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities) framework uses DNSSEC to provide a source of trust, and with TLSA it can serve as a root of trust for TLS certificates. This alternative to traditional certificate authorities is important given the risks inherent in trusting hundreds of organizations—risks already demonstrated with multiple compromises. The TLSA protocol was published in 2012, and this talk presents the first systematic study of its deployment. We studied TLSA usage, developing a tool that actively probes all signed zones in .com and .net for TLSA records. We find the TLSA use is early: in our latest measurement, of the 461k signed zones, we find only 701 TLSA names. We characterize how it is being used so far, and find that around 7–12% of TLSA records are invalid. We find 31% of TLSA responses are larger than 1500 Bytes and get IP fragmented.

The work in the talk is by Liang Zhu (USC/ISI), Duane Wessels and Allison Mankin (both of Verisign), and John Heidemann (USC/ISI).

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new talk “T-DNS: Connection-Oriented DNS to Improve Privacy and Security” given at DNS-OARC

John Heidemann gave the talk “T-DNS: Connection-Oriented DNS to Improve Privacy and Security” given at the Spring DNS-OARC meeting in Warsaw, Poland on May 10, 2014.  Slides are available at http://www.isi.edu/~johnh/PAPERS/Heidemann14c.html.

don't fear connections for DNS
don’t fear connections for DNS

From the abstract:

This talk will discuss connection-oriented DNS to improve DNS security and privacy. DNS is the canonical example of a connectionless, single packet, request/response protocol, with UDP as its dominant transport. Yet DNS today is challenged by eavesdropping that compromises privacy, source-address spoofing that results in denial-of-service (DoS) attacks on the server and third parties, injection attacks that exploit fragmentation, and size limitations that constrain policy and operational choices. We propose t-DNS to address these problems: it uses TCP to smoothly support large payloads and mitigate spoofing and amplification for DoS. T-DNS uses transport-layer security (TLS) to provide privacy from users to their DNS resolvers and optionally to authoritative servers.

Traditional wisdom is that connection setup will balloon latency for clients and overwhelm servers. We provide data to show that these assumptions are overblown–our model of end-to-end latency shows TLS to the recursive resolver is only about 5-24% slower, with UDP to the authoritative server. End-to-end latency is 19-33% slower with TLS to recursive and TCP to authoritative. Experiments behind these models show that after connection establishment, TCP and TLS latency is equivalent to UDP. Using diverse trace data we show that frequent connection reuse is possible (60-95% for stub and recursive resolvers, although half that for authoritative servers). With conservative timeouts (20 s at authoritative servers and 60 s elsewhere) we show that : a large recursive resolver may have 25k active connections consuming about 9 GB of RAM. These results depend on specific design and implementation decisions–query pipelining, out-of-order responses, TLS connection resumption, and plausible timeouts.

We hope to solicit feedback from the OARC community about this work to understand design and operational concerns if T-DNS deployment was widespread. The work in the talk is by Liang Zhu, Zi Hu, and John Heidemann (all of USC/ISI), Duane Wessels and Allison Mankin (both of Verisign), and Nikita Somaiya (USC/ISI).

A technical report describing the work is at http://www.isi.edu/ johnh/PAPERS/Zhu14a.pdf and the protocol changes are described ashttp://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-hzhwm-start-tls-for-dns/.

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new video “A Retrospective on an Australian Routing Event”

On 2012-02-23, hardware problems in an Australian ISP (Dodo) router caused it to announce many global routes to their ISP (Telstra), and from there to others.

The result: for 45 minutes, millions of Australians lost international Internet connectivity.

While this problem was detected and corrected in less than an hour, this kind of problem can reoccur.

In this video we show the Internet address space (IPv4) from Sydney, Australia.   Colors show estimated physical location (blue: North America, Red: Europe, Green: Asia).   Addresses map to a Hilbert Curve, and nearby addresses form squares.  White boxes show routing changes, with bursts after 02:40 UTC.

In the visualization we see there are many, many routing changes for much of Internet (the many white boxes)–evidence of routing instability in Sydney.

A copy of this video is also available at Vimeo (some system may have problems viewing the above embedded video, but Vimeo is a good alternative).

This video was made by Kaustubh Gadkari, John Heidemann, Cathie Olschanowsky, Christos Papadopoulos, Yuri Pradkin, and Lawrence Weikum at University of Southern California/Information Sciences Institute (USC/ISI) and Colorado State University/Computer Science (CSU).

This video uses software developed at USC/ISI and CSU:  Retro-future Time Travel, the LANDER IPv4 Web Address Browser, and BGPMon, the BGP logging and monitor.  Data from this video is available from BGPMon and PREDICT (or the authors).

This work was supported by DHS S&T (BGPMon, contract N66001-08-C-2028; LANDER, contract D08PC75599, admin. by SPAWAR; LACREND, contract FA8750-12-2-0344, admin. by AFRL; Retro-future, contract N66001-13-C-3001, admin. by SPAWAR), and NSF/CISE (BGPMon, grant CNS-1305404).  Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of funding and administrative agencies.

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keynote “Sharing Network Data: Bright Gray Days Ahead” given at Passive and Active Measurement Conference

I’m honored to have been invited to give the keynote talk “Sharing Network Data: Bright Gray Days Ahead” at the Passive and  Active Measurement Conference 2014 in Marina del Rey.

A copy of the talk slides are at http://www.isi.edu/~johnh/PAPERS/Heidemann14b (pdf)

some brighter alternatives
Some alternatives, perhaps brighter than the gray of standard anonymization.

From the talk’s abstract:

Sharing data is what we expect as a community. From the IMC best paper award requiring a public dataset to NSF data management plans, we know that data is crucial to reproducible science. Yet privacy concerns today make data acquisition difficult and sharing harder still. AOL and Netflix have released anonymized datasets that leaked customer information, at least for a few customers and with some effort. With the EU suggesting that IP addresses are personally identifiable information, are we doomed to IP-address free “Internet” datasets?
In this talk I will explore the issues in data sharing, suggesting that we need to move beyond black and white definitions of private and public datasets, to embrace the gray shades of data sharing in our future. Gray need not be gloomy. I will discuss some new ideas in sharing that suggest that, if we move beyond “anonymous ftp” as our definition, the future may be gray but bright.

This talk did not generate new datasets, but it grows out of our experiences distributing data through several research projects (such as LANDER and LACREND, both part of the DHS PREDICT program) mentioned in the talk with data available http://www.isi.edu/ant/traces/.  This talk represents my on opinions, not those of these projects or their sponsors.

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New Poster “Poster Abstract: Towards Active Measurements of Edge Network Outages” in PAM 2013

Lin Quan presented our outage work: “Poster Abstract: Towards Active Measurements of Edge Network Outages” at the PAM 2013 conference. Poster abstract is available at http://www.isi.edu/~johnh/PAPERS/Quan13a/index.html

pam_poster

End-to-end reachability is a fundamental service of the Internet. We study network outages caused by natural disasters, and political upheavals. We propose a new approach to outage detection using active probing. Like prior outage detection methods, our method uses ICMP echo requests (“pings”) to detect outages, but we probe with greater density and ner granularity, showing pings can detect outages without supplemental probing. The main contribution of our work is to de ne how to interpret pings as outages: defi ning an outage as a sharp change in block responsiveness relative to recent behavior. We also provide preliminary analysis of outage rate in the Internet edge. Space constrains this poster abstract to only sketches of our approach; details and validation are in our technical report. Our data is available at no charge, see http://www.isi.edu/ant/traces/internet_outages/.

This work is based on our technical report: http://www.isi.edu/~johnh/PAPERS/Quan12a/index.html, joint work by Lin Quan, John Heidemann and Yuri Pradkin.

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new talk “Long-term Data Collection and Analysis of Outages at the Edge” given at the AIMS workshop

John Heidemann gave the talk “Long-term Data Collection and Analysis of Outages at the Edge” at UCSD, San Diego, California on Feb. 8, 2013 as part of the CAIDA Active Internet Measurement Systems (AIMS) Workshop.  Slides are available at http://www.isi.edu/~johnh/PAPERS/Heidemann13e.html.

talk_icon

This talk describes our analysis of outages in edge networks at the time of Hurricane Sandy, and how that work was enabled by long-term data collection. The analysis showed U.S. networks had double the outage rate (from 0.2% to 0.4%) on 2012-10-30, the day after Sandy landfall, and recovered after four days. We highlighted long-term data collection of Internet Surveys, a random sample of about 41,000 /24 blocks, and the characteristics that make that data suitable for re-analysis. The talk was part of the CAIDA Workshop on Active Internet Measurement Systems, hosted at UCSD.

This work is based on our recent technical report   “A Preliminary Analysis of Network Outages During Hurricane Sandy“, joint work of John Heidemann, Lin Quan, and Yuri Pradkin.

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new abstract “Third-Party Measurement of Network Outages in Hurricane Sandy” and talk with video at FCC Workshop on Network Resiliency

We recently posted our abstract “Third-Party Measurement of Network Outages in Hurricane Sandy” at http://www.isi.edu/~johnh/PAPERS/Heidemann13c.html and the talk “Active Probing of Edge Networks: Hurricane Sandy and Beyond” at http://www.isi.edu/~johnh/PAPERS/Heidemann13d.html

These were part of the FCC Workshop on Network Resiliency at Brooklyn Law College, Brooklyn, NY on Feb. 6, 2013, chaired by Henning Schulzrinne.

Video from our talk and for the whole workshop is on YouTube.

fcc_youtube

A summary of the talk:

This talk summarized our analysis of outages in edge networks at the time of Hurricane Sandy. This analysis showed U.S. networks had double the outage rate (from 0.2% to 0.4%) on 2012-10-30, the day after Sandy landfall, and recovered after four days. It also describes our goal of tracking all outages in the Internet. The talk was part of the FCC workshop on Network Resiliency, hosted at Brooklyn Law College by Henning Schulzrinne.

This work is based on our recent technical report   “A Preliminary Analysis of Network Outages During Hurricane Sandy“, joint work of John Heidemann, Lin Quan, and Yuri Pradkin.

 

 

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New Talk “A Fresh Look At Scalable Forwarding Through Router FIB Caching”

Kaustubh Gadkari gave a talk on “A Fresh Look At Scalable Forwarding Through Router FIB Caching” at NANOG57 in Orlando, FL. Slides for the talk are available in pptx or pdf.

Kaustubh Gadkari at Nanog57This talk presented current research into the possibility of employing caching on router FIBs to reduce the amount of FIB memory required to forward packets. Our analysis shows that 99%+ packets can be forwarded from the cache with a cache size of 10,000 entries. Packets that caused cache misses were TCP SYNs and SYNACKs; no data packets were queued. Our analysis also shows that our caching system is robust against attacks against the cache.

This work is part of our ongoing work on the analysis of FIB caching, being advised by Christos Papadopolous and Dan Massey at Colorado State University.

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new talk “Active Probing of Edge Networks: Outages During Hurricane Sandy” at NANOG57

John Heidemann gave the talk “Active Probing of Edge Networks: Outages During Hurricane Sandy” at NANOG57 in Orlando Florida on Feb. 5, 2013 as part of a panel on Hurricane Sandy, hosted by James Cowie at Renesys.  Slides are available at http://www.isi.edu/~johnh/PAPERS/Heidemann13b.html.

m2051752.small

This talk summarizes our analysis of outages in edge networks at the time of Hurricane Sandy. This analysis showed U.S. networks had double the outage rate (from 0.2% to 0.4%) on 2012-10-30, the day after Sandy landfall, and recovered after four days. The talk was part of the panel “Internet Impacts of Hurricane Sandy”, moderated by James Cowie, with presentations by John Heidemann, USC/Information Sciences Institute; Emile Aben, RIPE NCC; Patrick Gilmore, Akamai; Doug Madory, Renesys.

This work is based on our recent technical report   “A Preliminary Analysis of Network Outages During Hurricane Sandy“, joint work of John Heidemann, Lin Quan, and Yuri Pradkin.

 

 

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New Video About Address Utilization and Allocations on Map Browser

The ANT project released a video describing Internet address allocation and how we study address utilization with IPv4 censuses. Aniruddh Rao prepared this video, working with John Heidemann and Xue Cai.

a scene from the ANT video describing address allocation and census taking

We have also updated our web-based IPv4 address browser to provide information about to what organizations each address block is allocated. The map now visualizes the whois allocation data; we thank the five regional internet registries for sharing this data with us and authorizing this visualization.

organizations in our Internet map

Finally, our web-based IPv4 address browser now has better time travel, with nearly 30 different census from Dec. 2005 to Nov. 2010, and we continue to update the map regularly.

Data collection for this work is through the LANDER project, and the map browser improvements are due to AMITE, both supported by DHS. Video preparation was supported by these projects and NSF through the MADCAT project.